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I develop a task-based model to study the effects of automation on labour demand.
I differentiate two kinds of technological innovations: those that allow machines to
replace labour in more tasks, and those that entail an improved version of a previous
machine. Aggregate output is produced combining complementary tasks. Innovations
improving previous machines are always beneficial for workers, since they just have
a productivity effect. On contrast, innovations extending automation to more tasks,
besides of a productivity effect, have a displacement effect. I find that if tasks are
complementary enough then, no matter how productive the new machines are, an
extension of automation to more tasks will always decrease wages. Then, motivated
by the importance of this productivity effect, I incorporate a second final good to my
baseline model. For the case of Leontief preferences, I find that if the second good is
sufficiently capital intensive, then the effects of automation on labour are worsened.
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1 Introduction
The advances in automation technologies offer promising opportunities as they allow to ex-
pand the production possibilities frontier. At the same time, however, automation poses
some threats because of its displacement effect, as it substitutes tasks previously performed
by workers. This raises doubts on the capacity of future labor markets to create enough
demand of labour, with the subsequent income distribution and social challenges.
The fear that machines could make human labour redundant is not a novel idea. Some his-
torical examples go from the patent denial of the William Lee’s knitting machine by Queen
Elizabeth I in 1589 arguing that it would deprive her subjects of employment, to the British
Luddite movement of the first half of the 19th century; or the predictions of some well-known
economists such as Keynes, who predicted that our capacity to replace labour would outrun
the pace at which we can find new uses for it (Keynes, 1933). Time has shown this fears to
be false. However, some advocate that this time may be different. The decline in the labour
share and the employment to population ratio in the US of last decades, as documented
in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), and Oberfield and Raval (2014), supports this vision
that the new automation wave may bring bad consequences for the future of work. Frey and
Osborne (2013) assess the probability that occupations have of getting automated in the next
decades, estimating that, with the current state of knowledge, around 47% of occupations
are at high risk of getting computerised.
This paper focuses on the impact of automation on labour demand. Automation consists on
the replacement of workers by machines that are more cost-effective, that is, that allow to
produce more at the same cost. Therefore, automation by itself is not a bad thing. But it can
be problematic if the profits of this automation process are not allocated properly among the
population, concentrating the profits on too few winners and generating an unsustainable
amount of losers which are worsened off due to losing their job and, thus, their major source
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of income. As explained above, labour, at least initially, is reduced by the adoption of these
new machines; however, there are some countervailing forces which increase the demand for
labour that can moderate, or even offset, the initial displacement effect (see also Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2018). On the one hand, as mentioned before, these new machines allow to
increase the production, which rises the demand of labour in the tasks performed by labour
that are needed to produce the final output. This is known as the productivity effect of au-
tomation. On the other hand, the extension of the tasks performed by machines (which, as I
do in the model, they can be interpreted as capital) increases the demand for capital, rising
its return, which, in turn, will incentive the accumulation of capital. This accumulation of
capital will increase production and, as before, labour demand.
I use an intuitive task-based framework where capital and labour are perfect substitutes in
tasks for which a machine has been invented. That way, capital will be used in a task if it’s
more cost-effective than labour. I differentiate two kinds of technological innovations: those
that allow machines to replace labour in more tasks, and those that entail improving previous
machines (or reducing their price). This framework allows us to study the effects of these
two processes of automation on wages. As expected, improving current machines is always
beneficial for labour, since it supposes an increase in the productivity of machines without
displacing labour. In contrast, the effect on wages of extending automation to other tasks
is not that clear and it will depend on whether the productivity effect or the displacement
effect dominates. In general, we get that it is the adoption of not very productive machines
(i.e. machines that are just a little bit preferable than labour or, as referred to in Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2017), “so-so” technologies) the ones that lead to a decrease in the demand
of labour (materialised by a drop in wages or an increase in unemployment). However, pro-
vided that tasks are complementary enough, I find that, no matter how productive these new
machines are, the displacement effect will dominate over the productivity effect and wages
will decrease.
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The effects of automation can vary depending on the type of good whose production expe-
riences the increase in automation. It may not be the same an increase in automation in a
luxury good, where demand can increase exploiting the productivity effect of automation,
than in a necessity good. The consequences may also vary depending on the labour intensity
of the other goods. This motivates me to extend the model adding a second final good. To
the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to study the effects of automation
in an economy with more than one final good. This extension, for the case of Leontief pref-
erences, shows how the reallocation of labour and capital between the two goods triggered
by the increase in automation in one good can reduce the bad consequences of automation
or intensify them, depending on the capital intensity of the other good.
The most related papers to this one are Hémous and Olsen (2017) and Acemoglu and Re-
strepo (2018, see also 2017 and 2019). Both present a task-based framework with two inno-
vation processes: automation and creation of new tasks. In the former there are two types of
workers (low- and high-skilled), machines can replace low-skilled ones, and innovation in new
tasks takes the form of horizontal innovation. Their model features non-balanced growth,
rising inequalities, in the form of increasing skilled premium, and a drop in the labor share.
In contrast, the latter achieves balanced-growth as a consequence of assuming new tasks
to be increasingly complex (the comparative advantage of labor is increasing in new tasks)
and to replace tasks at the bottom performed by machines. This way, innovation in new
tasks (labour-biased) can offset the displacement effect of automation (machine-biased) and
the model can achieve balanced-growth. Zeira and Nakamura (2018) focus on automation
unemployment, that is, the temporal unemployment due to the displaced workers by new
automation that remain unemployed for one period as they look for another job. They also
allow for the possibility of the creation of new tasks, though without giving any structure
to this process (new tasks will appear and adopted if it is economically optimal to do so).
With this, and assuming that labor share remains constant (following the Kaldor’s facts),
they find that automation unemployment converges to zero.
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In all these models with some kind of expanding variety there is one crucial assumption
which is that new tasks are more complex and difficult to be automated. We may agree that
they may require a period of time in order to fully understand their production process, but
after this relatively short time, it’s not that clear that future tasks will be more difficult to
automate. For this reason, and though undoubtedly, as we have already seen in the past,
new technology will bring new tasks, I don’t explicitly account for this. However, the ef-
fect of creating new tasks is equivalent to a reduction of the number of automated tasks.
Also related to this paper is Peretto and Seater (2013), which presents a model with factor-
eliminating technical change in which firms, through innovation that allows to increase the
elasticity of output respect capital, reduce their need of labor.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model.
Section 3 studies the direct effects of extending and improving automation. Section 4 studies
some countervailing forces. Section 5 presents two extensions: a simple way of endogenizing
the two innovation processes, and another introducing a second final good in the model.




I assume the preferences of the population can be identified as those of a representative
household, with preferences u(c,l), where c is consumption of the single final good and l is
the labour supply, as fraction of time. As usual, assume uc < 0, ucc > 0, ul < 0, ull < 0.







s.t. ṡt = strt + wtlt − ct
Where ρ is the continuous discount rate, s are savings, r is the interest rate and w is the







= rt − ρ (2)
2.2 Producer of the final good
The production of the final good requires a continuum of N imperfectly complementary tasks
(i.e. elasticity of substitution between tasks is σ ∈ (0, 1)). We can find several examples
supporting this complementarity, like the fatal disaster of the space shuttle Challenger caused
by a single component, the O-rings (see Kremer, 1993). I assume a monopolist final good
producer, with a mark-up µ (profits will be necessary to incentive innovation and this mark-
up has to be at the final good producer level because, due to the complementarity of tasks,











Where y(x) is the intermediate good produced by task x. Profit maximization leads to the
following demand of tasks:
y(x) = yP σp(x)−σ (4)
Where P is the price of the final good and p(x) the (internal) price of the intermediate
good of task x. Using (4) and that profits are defined by the mark-up on costs and then
normalising P to 1:
0 = Py − (1 + µ)
∫ N
0














Each task, indexed by x, can be produced by labour or capital (machines), conditional on
the existence of a machine able to perform the task. Labour and capital are assumed to be
perfect substitutes, so that the task production function is of the form:
y(x) = γL(x)l(x) + γK(x)k(x) (6)
Task x will be produced by labour if the cost is lower using labour than using capital (if






, where R is the
rental price of capital.
I order tasks non-decreasingly in
γL(x)
γK(x)
(i.e. from low to high comparative advantage of
labour). That way, we have two intervals: one with the tasks for which there exists a
machine that can make the task, x ∈ [0, θ∗], and the interval of tasks that have to be done
forcefully by labour, x ∈ (θ∗, N ]. Further, let [0, θ] be the rang of tasks that are actually






. That way, if θ = θ̄, then there are tasks (x ∈ [θ̄, θ∗]) for
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which there exists a machine but it is not used. On contrary, if θ = θ∗, then technology is
binding.




, x ∈ [0, θ] p(x) = w
γL(x)
, x ∈ (θ,N ] (7)
2.4 Static Equilibrium











, x ∈ (θ,N ] (8)
Using this, factor demands are:
k(x) = yR−σγK(x)
σ−1, x ∈ [0, θ] l(x) = yw−σγL(x)σ−1, x ∈ (θ,N ] (9)
Combining (5) with (7), leads to:



















































Plugging (11) and (12) into (10) we get the final good production function represented as a
CES production function of K and l:

























For labour market to clear, both (1) and (11) have to be satisfied.
The law of motion of capital is:
K̇t = (Rt − δ)Kt + wtlt − ct (14)
And asset market clearing imply rt = Rt − δ.
2.5 Dynamic equilibrium
Given time paths for {θ∗t , γK,t(x)} and an initial level of capital, K0, the dynamic equilibrium
is a time path for {θt, Kt, ct, lt} satisfying:
1. Labour-leisure equation (1) and Euler equation (2)













4. The law of motion of capital (14)





Given θt and γK,t(x), we can study the phase diagram on the plane ct, Kt, and in particular
the loci ċ = 0 and K̇ = 0.
First, from the Euler equation, ċ = 0 imply R = δ + ρ. If labour were supplied inelastically,
then there would be just one value of K satisfying it ( and, thus, ċ = 0 would be a vertical line
in the phase diagram). But, if labour supply is elastic, then ċ = 0 features a downward slope
in K. The intuition is as follows. A decrease in c allows to increase K, which increases output
using the same level of L and, so, wages increase (marginal product of labour increases). This
will incentive to supply more labour (from w = −uL
uc
, uL < 0 and uLL < 0) and this, in turn,
will increase R, raising the level of capital that satisfies R = δ + ρ.
Next, from the law of motion of capital, the locus K̇ = 0 is defined by the equation c =
y(l,K)− δK. Then, the phase diagram takes the form of the following illustration. (See the
Appendix for a proof of the Existence and Unicity of the steady state).
3 Extending Automation and Improving Machines
The model presented in the previous section allows us to differentiate between two processes
of automation: the extension of automation to more tasks (i.e. increase θ) and the improve-
ment of machines in already automated tasks (i.e. an increase of γK(x) for at least some
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x ∈ [0, θ]). In this section I study how these two forms of automation affect the economy.
3.1 Change in γK(x)
First, using (13) we get that the marginal product of an improvement of the machine per-





























+ (σ − 2)γK(x)σ−3
]
< 0
In particular, if we assumed that machines have the same productivity in all tasks (and that
increasing the productivity of machines in one task implied increasing the productivity of
















































































+ (σ − 1)
 < R γK(x)σ−2∫ θ
0
γK(x)σ−1dx
Where the last inequality follows from (13), and constitutes an upper bound that correspond
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to the case where all tasks are performed by capital. On the one hand an improvement of
machines unambiguously benefits wages. Note that this increase will be greater the higher
the complementarity between labour and capital (i.e. lower σ), but the sign wouldn’t be
negative even if factors were substitutes. On the other hand, the sign of the effect on R is
ambiguous. It will depend on the degree of complementarity between tasks and the amount
of tasks performed by machines: the higher complementarity (lower σ) and the fewer tasks
are performed by machines the more likely the effect will be negative. The intuition is clear:
due to the complementarity of tasks in producing the final output, the increase in output
due to the increase in productivity in machines is slowed down by the presence of labour
tasks, the productivity of which is unchanged, driving down the demand of capital.

































Next, we can ask how a change in γK(x) affects K̇ = 0 and ċ = 0 and, therefore, the steady
state of the economy.
ċ = 0 implies R = δ + ρ so the locus will shift to the right (resp. left) if γK(x) affects posi-
tively (resp. negatively) R, which depends on σ and θ, as discussed. If the complementarity
between tasks is high enough, then ċ = 0 will shift to the left, which will tend to decrease
both capital and consumption in the steady state.
K̇ = 0 implies c = y−δK. So, since ∂y
γK
> 0, the locus will shift upwards. This shift tends to
increase consumption in the steady state and reduce capital (due to the endogenous labour
supply).
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3.2 Change in θ


















































































So, extending automation never harms production, conditional on the adoption of new tech-
nologies being based on efficiency criteria. The second derivative may become positive due














































This tells us that extending automation will lead to a decrease in wages if the producti-vity
effect of automation is not enough to offset the displacement effect. In terminology of Ace-
moglu & Restrepo (2017), it is the ”so-so” new machines (i.e. those machines that are just
a bit more efficient than labour) the ones that are detrimental for workers. This leads us
to the question: how many times (x∗) less costly has to be, at least, the newly invented
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machine in order to have a positive impact on wages. This is what x∗ tells us if we define it







≤ 0}. This number, at the same time, informs us of what
drop in wages would be necessary in order that keeping the task automated would necessar-
ily require the productivity effect to offset the initial displacement effect. In other words,
imagine a machine that displaces labour in task i but without any productivity effect. In
this case, if automation is extended to more tasks decreasing wages, then, in order to keep
task i automated, the productivity of machine i will have to increase, and this will offset a
bit the initial displacement effect. Further extension of automation could drop wages even
more, forcing further improvement of machine i, etc.
So, if we found that x∗ tends to∞, then wages would be always harmed by an increase of θ,
no matter how productive the new machines are. Or with the wage interpretation. it would
imply that even the productivity effect that would make the machine preferable than labour
with w = 0 wouldn’t be enough to compensate the initial displacement effect. From (16):
∂w
∂θ
































)σ−1 ≤ γL(θ)σ−1∫ N
θ
γL(x)σ−1dx





















































< 1 . Therefore, note that if σ → 0,
then even if x∗ →∞ , the inequality holds (i.e. even with the highest possible productivity
effect, wages would decrease). That way, we have seen that, if tasks are complementary
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enough, then it is not only the increase of θ through ”so-so” technologies what delivers
∂w
∂θ
< 0. This is synthesised in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: If tasks are complementary enough (i.e. σ low enough), then an increase in θ
always decreases wages, regardless of the efficiency of these new machines.
The intuition behind the previous result is that the higher the complementarity between
tasks, the more limited the productivity effect will be, since the other (less productive) tasks
will be more needed in order to complete the production process.
The previous reasoning of the necessary improvement of machines before extending automa-
tion to other tasks relies on wages falling enough. This increase in some γK(x) won’t be neces-




, x ∈ [0, θ]},
under which, labour would be employed again in some previously automated tasks. This
condition would be trivially achieved if there were a minimum wage above this threshold; in
this case, extending automation through ”so-so” machines would harm labour by throwing
them out of the labour market without limit. Another sufficient condition to be able to
increase θ through ”so-so” machines without limit is to assume a sufficiently elastic labour
supply. In such a circumstance, the reduction of the labour supply would slow down the






















Finally, as with γK , we can see how a change in θ affects K̇ = 0 and ċ = 0. On the one hand,
since an increase in θ increases R, ċ = 0 locus will shift to the right, tending to increase
capital. On the other hand, as with γK , an increase in θ increases output, so it also shifts
K̇ = 0 locus upwards, tending to increase consumption.
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4 Countervailing forces to the descend in wages
In this section, I want to see if wages can decrease with θ even after accounting for other
forces that act in the opposite direction, such as capital accumulation towards the new steady
state and the adjustment of the labour supply.
4.1 Capital Adjustment
Using (12) considering R constant (note that in the long run it will return to the steady
state level, R = δ + ρ), we can get how K changes after an increase of θ. And from (11), we



































Where in the second equality I have used again the definition of R from (12). To see that it
may not be enough to offset the decline of wages observed in the previous section, assume
the extreme case with no productivity effect (i.e. ∂y
∂θ






























In order to conclude that the overall effect is still negative, we need the element in the square





















So, we conclude that this countervailing force may not be enough and, therefore, that in the
new steady state we may have a lower wage.
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4.2 Labour Supply Adjustment
As the demand for labour declines (i.e. for a same level of employment the firm will be
paying a lower wage), labour supply adjusts declining too (if the reward to work is lower,
then individuals will prefer to devote more time to leisure and less to work).













The result comes from (1) and assuming that an θ decreases the demand for labour (i.e. that
the displacement effect wins over the productivity and capital adjustment effects). If the
increase in θ implied an increase in wages, then the labour supply effect would be negative
on wages, smoothing the increase in wages.
Therefore, note that this countervailing force will never change the sign of the effect of θ on
wages, it will just smooth the change.
5 Extensions
5.1 Endogenous Innovations
In line with the previous sections, there are two possible innovations: to increase γK and to
increase θ. For simplicity, I am going to assume: i) γL(x) is increasing in x; ii) γK(x) = γK
for all x ∈ [0, θ], that is, that machines have the same absolute productivity both in newly





, so that it is efficient to extend automation.
The profits of the firm (using (5)):
π = y −
∫ N
0





















How much will the firm spend in R&D? Let S be the spending in R&D and we can write
the present value Hamiltonian: H = e−
∫ t
0 rsds(πt − St) + λtSt
Which leads to the optimality condition: rt =
∂πt
∂S
Which tells us that the firm will spend in R&D as long as the increase in profits is bigger
than the financing cost. The innovation-market clearing condition (for the case it is optimal
to allocate a positive amount of spending both in increasing current machines productivity,





























































Note that (using (11) and (12)) πθ = 0 if assumption iii) doesn’t hold. This tells us, as
it is logical, that the firm will not invest in innovation in θ if the new machines will not
be implemented. That is, in this case, machines will have to improve before advancing in
automating other tasks.




















The intuitive result that we would expect of this simple extension is to have a positive
relationship between the relative facility to innovate and the relative state of technologies
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(i.e. that an increase in ηγ
ηθ
implies an increase in γK
θ
). In order for this to hold, we need
the derivative of the first term in the right hand side to dominate over the one of the second



















And this is certainly satisfied due to σ ∈ (0, 1) and assumption iii).
5.2 Two Final Goods
In the previous analysis of the impact of automation on wages, the productivity effect played
an important role. However, the possibility to produce more doesn’t translate immediately
in an increase of production. It was so in the previous model since we were assuming a single
final good, but it wouldn’t be the case in an economy with different goods if the demand
doesn’t support the increase in production of that good. Also, with a single good, all the
labour and capital are used in the production of this good, while if there are different goods,
we allow for movements of labour and capital across firms. With the inclusion of a second
final good in the economy, I want to extend the previous model to take into account these
issues. I divide the problem in two parts, first I find the equilibrium in the supply side and,
then, I introduce the demand side.
Supply Side
The supply problem is analogous to the one developed in the baseline model but for two
























The price of each good is derived from the zero profits condition (for this section, we don’t





















Defining li (resp. Ki) as the amount of labour (resp. capital) employed by firm i, and using
the tasks production function (6), the demand of tasks (20) and pi(x) = ci(x) with ci =
Ri
γK(x)























I normalize P1 = 1. Then, note that w1 and R1 depend just on l1 and K1. Plugging (22) and
(23) into (21) we get the final good production function represented as a CES production
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Analogously, perfect capital mobility between firms implies capital rents equalization (Ri =













Note that in equilibrium (i.e. with wi = w and Ri = R), P2 will be determined just by l1 and
K1: P2(w1(l1, K1), R1(l1, K1)). That way, we can characterise the supply side equilibrium by

























I could have defined it from (26) instead of (25) without loss of generality, since P2(w1(l1, K1), R1(l1, K1))
guarantees that if one is satisfied then the other will be satisfied too. The following lemmas













Lemma 1 tells us that the supply locus is increasing. Next lemmas helps us to assess how
does the supply locus moves after an increase in θ.






So, an increase of automation in good 1 shifts the equilibrium in the supply locus to the left
(i.e. F1 = 0 to the left).
Demand Side
I consider that the representative household’s preferences are given by the nonhomothetic






















And set the cardinalization g(u) = E
P
where P is the Price Index (for simplicity, we could
use P1 = 1 as Price Index).
Also to simplify the analysis, I will assume that the amount saved is a constant fraction of
income, sY; so that expenditure is: E = (1− s)Y . In particular, ci = (1− s)yi. Then, (29)






[(1− s)(P2y2 + y1)](1−e)(ν1−ν2) (30)
From this and using P2(w1(l1, K1), R1(l1, K1)), as in the supply side, define F2(l1, K1) = 0,
which represents the demand locus. The following lemma is the analogous of Lemma 1 and
characterises the shape of F2 = 0 in the {l1, K1} plane.













Lemma 5: F2(0, 0) < 0 and F2(L,K) > 0. F2(l1, K1) = 0 tends to the corners (L,0) and
(0,K), but without including these extreme points.
Therefore, the demand locus is decreasing and crosses exactly at one point with the supply




















As we see with Lemma 6, the effect of an increase in automation in good 1 is not that clear
as for the supply. The first term is clearly non-negative, but the second term will depend on
the sign of the part in square brackets. The first term inside the square brackets corresponds
to the price effect, while the second one to the income effect.
On the one hand, the price effect makes that as P2 increases, the demand of good 1 increases
(which implies increasing both l1 and K1). As it is known, this price effect is higher the
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more substitutes the two goods are.
On the other hand, the income effect is more diverse. We can distinguish two cases: if good
1 and 2 are substitutes or if they are complements. If they are substitutes (i.e. e > 1), then
an increase in income will lead to an increase in relative consumption of the good with lower
νi. In other words, if they are substitutes, the good with higher income elasticity is the
one with lower νi. On the contrary, if they are complements, the good with higher income
elasticity is the one with greater νi.
But we need to know how an increase in θ1 affects both P2 and income. We already know
that ∂y1
∂θ1
≥ 0, therefore it is just left to see ∂lnP2
∂θ1
, which is the purpose of next lemma.




























A complete study of the different possible forces in the model would require more time and,
thus, I leave it to further research. However, and in order to gain intuition, I am going to
study two particular cases: the Leontief and the perfect substitutes preferences.
5.2.1 Perfect Substitutes
This case corresponds to setting e = ∞ and ν1 = ν2. In these preferences there is only
consumption in the cheapest good (i.e. y2 = 0 if P2 > 1). Therefore, if P2 > 1, the effect
of an increase of θ1 is equivalent to the one of the baseline model with a single final good;
whereas if P2 < 1, the effect is null.
5.2.2 Leontief preferences
These specific preferences correspond to the case where e = 0 and ν1 = ν2, so there is no










Consequently, as θ1 increases F2 = 0 is curved down, as illustrated it in the following graph.
In the following I provide some intuition of the mechanism behind the graph. First, note
that Lemma 3 tells us that w1 falls more (or increases less) than w2. This is because, since R1
grows at a higher rate than w1, then P2 grows at a higher rate than w. For the same reason,
R1 increases more than R2. Second, note that, at this first moment (without moving from
the initial point), w1 moves as w does in the single good model. Third, due to the perfect
mobility of labour and capital, these imbalances of wages and rents of capital between the
two goods will trigger a reallocation of factors, which will allow to increase both y1 and y2
maintaining the ratio marked by the Leontief preferences. In particular, labour will move
from good 1 to good 2, pushing w1 towards w2; however, the direction of reallocation of
capital is not that clear. On the one hand, without considering any productivity effect, as
mentioned a few lines above, the shift in F1 = 0 will tend to increase more R1, tending to
increase capital in good 1, which would also push w1 towards w2. On the other hand, if
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there is a productivity effect, the movement of F2 = 0 will tend to decrease K1 and l1, which
have opposite consequences for w1. Note that the more steeper the F1 = 0 is, the higher
the descend in K1 will be respect the descend in l1 and, therefore, the more likely w1 will
decrease (and this could dominate over the initial increase due to exclusively the movement
of F1 = 0). Now, if we examine the explicit expressions of the slope of F1 = 0 found in the
Appendix in the Proof of Lemma 1 (see (33) or (34)), we can realise that it will be steeper the
more capital intensive good 2 is. In order to get more intuition about the previous reasoning,
suppose the extreme case where good 2 is fully automated and only uses capital. Note that
graphically this would correspond to F1 = 0 being a vertical line in l1 = L and F2 = 0 would
be just a point in that line. In this case, an increase of θ1 will have the following effects. If
the productivity effect is null, it will be as in the single good model, with no movement of
factors. w1 decreases while R1 increases and, to preserve R1 = R2, we see that P2 has to
increase at the same rate (recall that a sufficient condition for ∂P2
∂θ1
> 0 was that good 2 were
more capital intensive, which is clearly satisfied). If the productivity effect is positive, since
the demand won’t accept a higher y1 unless y2 also increases, P2 will increase more than R1
to incentive capital to move from good 1 to good 2, so that the production of both goods
is increased. Graphically, the only movement is from the point defined by F2 = 0, which
shifts down. Note that this movement of capital will depress even more w1. The case where
good 2 only uses labour is analogous. So, a conclusion that we can extract from the previous
analysis is that the existence of a second good with Leontief preferences can smooth the bad
consequences of automation on wages (or even make the overall effect positive) if good 2 is




Automation poses one of the most important challenges of the future for our society and,
especially, for the labour market. It is important that we get prepared before we are poten-
tially hit and, for this reason, we need to increase our understanding of this phenomenon and
its effects in order to be able to respond to it in the best possible way. The baseline model of
this paper offers a study of the effects on labour that, to some extent, extends the previous
literature, as it proves that, provided that the complementarity of tasks is high enough, an
extension of automation will always damage labour regardless of the productivity of the new
machines. Therefore, ”so-so” machines may not be the only ones damaging labour.
I want to finish this thesis by mentioning how this research could be extended. The first clear
line of research would be to complete the study of the Two Goods model. The mechanism
behind this model is not trivial at all, and exploring the effects allowing income and price
effects in the demand may bring some valuable insights. In this line, it would be interesting
to see the different effects of automating a luxury from a necessity good, or (imperfect)
complementary from (imperfect) substitute goods. A second interesting extension would
be to relax the assumption of perfect labour mobility. In the reality, jobs are very diverse
and so are their skill requirements. This can make the reallocation of labour more difficult
and intensify the bad consequences of automation. A third extension could be to study the
distributional implications of automation. As we have seen, automation is always good, in
the sense that it allows to produce more, but it could be bad for social welfare if its benefits
are retained by a minority.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Existence and Unicity of the Steady State
First, we can study a bit the shape of K̇ = 0. It contains the origin, since for K = 0,











− δ. Note that when K = 0: ∂y
∂K
→∞ , and since the adjustment of




Next, I compute the marginal product of capital:
∂y
∂K












= (1 + µ)−
σ
1−σR (31)
To ensure the existence and unicity of a steady state (K̇ = 0 and ċ = 0) we need to see that
∂y
∂K
is decreasing and that it decreases enough so that R = δ + ρ is satisfied for some K:

























































































































































Where, from logarithms of (11) and (12) and using that (by constant returns to scale in l























































































Analogously as before, we can see that ∂P2
∂K1












> 0 is straightforward from applying the Implicit Function Theorem.
After some algebra, using the definitions (22) and (23), that F1 = 0 implies both wi = w







































Note that if good 2 is very capital intensity, the slope will increase. In (33) it is easy to see
since K2
l2
is in the numerator and in (34) note that in the extreme case of full automation,
then θ2 = N2 and l2 = 0, so that the denominator becomes 0.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 2:

























Plugging this into (21) with
P1 = 1, we get R1 = 0. On the other hand, since K2 = 0, then y2 = 0. With the previous
results, is easy to check that F1(0, K) > 0.
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Plugging this into (21) with
P1 = 1, we get w1 = 0. On the other hand, since l2 = 0, y2 = 0. With the previous results,
is easy to check that F1(0, K) < 0.
























σ−1dx · σP σ−12
∂P2
∂θ1


















































so that we see that the terms containing ∂lny1
∂θ1





















8.5 Derivation of the demand function:












































Multiplying (36) by Pi and adding up, we get, using (37), that E =
λ
φ
























[(1− s)(P2y2 + y1)](e−1)(ν1−ν2)















= 0. Then, note that the third term is null since in







































8.7 Proof of Lemma 5:
I am going to examine the sign of F2(l1, K1) at the corners:
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1. l1 = 0, K1 = K: Since l1 = 0, then y1 = 0. Analogously, since K2 = 0, then y2 = 0. So,
F2(0, K) is not defined. However, it is easily seen that it cannot be satisfied neither for
any point (0,z) with z ∈ [0, K), since it would be y1 = 0 while y2 > 0, nor for any (z,K)
with z ∈ (0, L], since it would be y1 > 0 while y2 = 0. Therefore F2 = 0 approaches
the corner (0,K) but it is not defined at this point.
2. l1 = 0, K1 = 0: F2 < 0 since y2 > 0 while y1 = 0.
3. l1 = L, K1 = 0: Analogously to case 1, we can guess that F2 = 0 approaches the corner
(L,0) but is not defined at it.
4. l1 = L, K1 = K: F2 > 0 since y2 = 0 while y1 > 0.
8.8 Proof of Lemma 7:
Before going with the proof of Lemma 7, it may also be interesting to have some identity
















































Since P1 is normalized to 1,
∂P1
∂θ1
















































































From the previous equation it is straightforward that if the productivity effect is bigger than






) then P2 will increase.





























































































This tells us that the effect on P2 will be positive if good 1 is sufficiently more labour in-
tensive than good 2. This is intuitive, since we have previously seen that an increase in θ
increases R
w
, and, therefore, it will tend to impact more on its price if the good requires more
capital. In particular, this tells us that if the productivity effect is zero, then ∂P2
∂θ1
> 0 (resp.
< 0) if good 1 is more (resp. less) labour intensive than good 2.
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Next, it may be interesting to see in which cases the productivity effect increases the effect of










) > 0). Combining (36) with (38), we see that this is satisfied








































Since P2 > 0, this is clearly satisfied if the right-hand side is negative, which happens when




). The intuition is: if good 2 requires
less capital, then its price is less affected than the price of good 1 by the increase of the
rental rate, but increases more than the one of good 1 as wages rise following the increase
in the productivity effect. But this sufficient condition can be relaxed. Using the definition


























































σ−1dx , the term inside the





































































































) > 0 is good 1 to be less than two
times more labour intensive than good 2.
From the results above, we see that if good 1 is more labour intensive than good 2 but less
than two times as good 2 (i.e. part ii of Lemma 7), then if the productivity effect is 0,
∂P2
∂θ1
> 0 and if the productivity effect is positive, ∂P2
∂θ1
will be even bigger, which proves this
part ii.
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